SOCIAL IMAGE AND THE 50-50 NORM: A THEORETICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF AUDIENCE EFFECTS

被引:564
作者
Andreoni, James [1 ,2 ]
Bernheim, B. Douglas [2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Calif San Diego, Dept Econ, La Jolla, CA 92093 USA
[2] NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[3] Stanford Univ, Dept Econ, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
Social image; audience effects; signaling; dictator game; altruism; INCOMPLETE INFORMATION; IMPURE ALTRUISM; SIGNALING GAMES; ULTIMATUM GAMES; FAIRNESS; EXPLANATION; DOMINANCE; BEHAVIOR; EQUITY;
D O I
10.3982/ECTA7384
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
A norm of 50-50 division appears to have considerable force in a wide range of economic environments. both In the real world and in the laboratory. Even in settings where one party unilaterally determines the allocation of a prize (the dictator game). many subjects voluntarily cede exactly half to another individual The hypothesis that people care about fairness does not by itself account for key experimental patterns. We consider :in alternative explanation, which adds the hypothesis that people like to lie perceived its fair The properties of equilibria for the resulting signaling game correspond closely to laboratory observations. The theory has additional testable implications, the validity of which we confirm through new experiments
引用
收藏
页码:1607 / 1636
页数:30
相关论文
共 56 条