Robust coordination of supply chain with loss aversion

被引:8
作者
Zhai, Jia [1 ,2 ]
Yu, Hui [3 ]
机构
[1] Chongqing Univ, Postdoctoral Res Ctr Business Adm, Chongqing 400030, Peoples R China
[2] Chongqing Univ Technol, Sch Business Adm, Chongqing 400054, Peoples R China
[3] Chongqing Univ, Sch Econ & Business Adm, Chongqing 400030, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Supply chain coordination; Robust approach; Loss aversion; BL contract; FREE NEWSBOY PROBLEM; NEWSVENDOR PROBLEM; MANUFACTURER; INFORMATION; RETAILERS; DECISION; BALKING; SALES; MODEL;
D O I
10.1007/s12652-018-1094-7
中图分类号
TP18 [人工智能理论];
学科分类号
081104 ; 0812 ; 0835 ; 1405 ;
摘要
This paper considers a supply chain consisting of a risk-neutral supplier and a loss-averse retailer under limited distributional information of demand. The robust approach is applied to deal with the integrated decision model and the decentralized decision model when only the mean and variance of demand distribution is assumed to be known. A combined buy-back and loss-sharing contract (BL contract) is designed to coordinate the supply chain and arbitrarily allocate the expected profit between two sides of the supply chain. Specially, the explicit expression of the unique buy-back credit that can coordinate the supply chain is provided when the loss-sharing fraction equals to the reciprocal of the loss aversion degree. Several numerical experiments are performed to illustrate the effects of parameters on the decision.
引用
收藏
页码:3693 / 3707
页数:15
相关论文
共 41 条
[1]   The distribution-free newsboy problem: Extensions to the shortage penalty case [J].
Alfares, HK ;
Elmorra, HH .
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PRODUCTION ECONOMICS, 2005, 93-4 :465-477
[2]  
[Anonymous], 1996, TAKING RISKS MANAGEM
[3]  
[Anonymous], 1999, QUANTITATIVE MODELS, DOI DOI 10.1007/978-1-4615-4949-9_10
[4]  
ANUPINDI R, 1999, QUANTITATIVE MODELS, P199
[5]   Mental accounting, loss aversion, and individual stock returns [J].
Barberis, N ;
Huang, M .
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 2001, 56 (04) :1247-1292
[6]   Loss averse behavior [J].
Brooks, P ;
Zank, H .
JOURNAL OF RISK AND UNCERTAINTY, 2005, 31 (03) :301-325
[7]  
Cachon GP, 2003, HDBK OPER R, V11, P229, DOI 10.1016/s0927-0507(03)11006-7
[8]   Supply chain coordination with revenue-sharing contracts: Strengths and limitations [J].
Cachon, GP ;
Lariviere, MA .
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 2005, 51 (01) :30-44
[9]   Impact of risk levels on optimal selling to heterogeneous retailers under dual uncertainties [J].
Chen, Huiru ;
Wang, Xiaobin ;
Liu, Zhibing ;
Zhao, Ruiqing .
JOURNAL OF AMBIENT INTELLIGENCE AND HUMANIZED COMPUTING, 2017, 8 (05) :727-745
[10]   Manufacturer-retailer contracting with asymmetric information on retailer's degree of loss aversion [J].
Deng, Xiaoxue ;
Xie, Jinxing ;
Xiong, Huachun .
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PRODUCTION ECONOMICS, 2013, 142 (02) :372-380