Combinatorial Auctions with Interdependent Valuations: SOS to the Rescue

被引：6
作者：
Eden, Alon [1 ]
Feldman, Michal [1 ,2 ]
Fiat, Amos [1 ]
Goldner, Kira [3 ]
Karlin, Anna R. [3 ]
机构：
[1] Tel Aviv Univ, Tel Aviv, Israel
[2] Microsoft Res, Tel Aviv, Israel
[3] Univ Washington, Seattle, WA 98195 USA
来源：
ACM EC '19: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2019 ACM CONFERENCE ON ECONOMICS AND COMPUTATION | 2019年
基金：
欧洲研究理事会; 以色列科学基金会;
关键词：
D O I：
10.1145/3328526.3329759
中图分类号：
TP39 [计算机的应用];
学科分类号：
081203 ; 0835 ;
摘要：
引用
收藏
页码：19 / 20
页数：2
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