An algorithm for identifying least manipulable envy-free and budget-balanced allocations in economies with indivisibilities

被引：0

作者：

Andersson, Tommy ^{[1
]}

Ehlers, Lars ^{[2
,3
]}

机构：

[1] Lund Univ, Dept Econ, Lund, Sweden

[2] Univ Montreal, Dept Sci Econ, CP 6128,Succursale Ctr Ville, Montreal, PQ H3C 3J7, Canada

[3] Univ Montreal, CIREQ, CP 6128,Succursale Ctr Ville, Montreal, PQ H3C 3J7, Canada

来源：

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 2022年 / 18卷 / 01期

基金：

加拿大魁北克医学研究基金会;

关键词：

algorithm; budget‐ balance; envy‐ freeness; least manipulable; FAIR ALLOCATION; NO-ENVY; DIVISION; RULES; GOODS;

D O I：

10.1111/ijet.12300

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We analyze the problem of allocating indivisible objects and monetary compensations to a set of agents. In particular, we consider envy-free and budget-balanced rules that are least manipulable with respect to agents counting or with respect to utility gains. A key observation is that, for any profile of quasi-linear preferences, the outcome of any such least manipulable envy-free rule can be obtained via so-called agent- k-linked allocations. Given this observation, we provide an algorithm for identifying agent- k-linked allocations.

引用

页码：50 / 60

页数：11

共 31 条

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Green J., 1979, Incentives in Public Decision-Making

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