Cluster evolution in public goods game with fairness mechanism

被引:3
作者
Zhang, Baojian [1 ]
Cui, Zeguang [1 ]
Yue, Xiaohang [2 ]
机构
[1] Shanxi Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Management Sci & Engn, Taiyuan 030006, Shanxi, Peoples R China
[2] Univ Wisconsin, Lubar Sch Business, Milwaukee, WI 53211 USA
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Public goods game; Fairness mechanism; Punishment; Cluster evolution; PUNISHMENT PROMOTES COOPERATION; RECIPROCITY;
D O I
10.1016/j.physa.2019.121796
中图分类号
O4 [物理学];
学科分类号
0702 ;
摘要
Defector contributes nothing but gains benefit in public goods game. This phenomenon creates an incentive for free riding and causes inefficient equilibrium in which everyone is defector. However, coexistence of cooperation and defection is pervasive for a large well-mixed population in nature society. Inspired by the fact that humans have strong but also emotional tendencies for fair play, we employ a fairness mechanism with peer punishment to solve the public goods problem of a well-mixed cluster and aim to analyze cluster evolutionary process. The process is divided into three stages. In the first stage called cluster formation, this problem can be effectively solved by same-strategy groups. The second stage is cluster extension, we utilize multiplayer game and prove that increasing fairness factor and decreasing punishment cost are two effective ways to improve cooperation. Finally, we obtain the coexistence of cooperation and defection in the third stage called boom and bust. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
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页数:12
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