Phenomenal concepts and higher-order experiences

被引:22
作者
Carruthers, P [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Maryland, College Pk, MD USA
关键词
D O I
10.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00343.x
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
Relying on a range of now-familiar thought-experiments, it has seemed to many philosophers that phenomenal consciousness is beyond the scope of reductive explanation. (Phenomenal consciousness is a form of state-consciousness, which contrasts with creature-consciousness, or perceptual-consciousness. The different forms of state-consciousness include various kinds of access-consciousness, both first-order and higher-order--see Rosenthal, 1986; Black, 1995; Lycan, 1996; Carruthers, 2000. Phenomenal consciousness is the property that mental states have when it is like something to possess them, or when they have subjectively-accessible feels; or as some would say, when they have qualia (see fn. 1 below). Others have thought that we can undermine the credibility of those thought-experiments by allowing that we possess purely recognitional concepts for the properties of our conscious mental states. this paper is concerned to explain, and then to meet, the challenge of showing how purely recognitional concepts are possible if there are no such things as qualia--in the strong sense of intrinsic (non-relational, non-intentional) properties of experience. It argues that an appeal to higher-order experiences is necessary to meet hits challenge, and then deploys a novel form of higher-order thought theory to explain how such experiences are generated.
引用
收藏
页码:316 / 336
页数:21
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