Welfare-improving vertical separation with network externality

被引：11

作者：

Choi, Kangsik ^{[1
]}

Lee, DongJoon ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Pusan Natl Univ, Grad Sch Int Studies, Busandaehak Ro 63 Beon Gil 2, Pusan 46241, South Korea

[2] Nagoya Univ Commerce & Business, Fac Commerce, 4-4 Sagamine,Komenoki Cho, Nisshin, Aichi 4700193, Japan

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2017年 / 151卷

基金：

日本学术振兴会; 新加坡国家研究基金会;

关键词：

Double-margin distortion; Product differentiation; Network externalities; Vertical separation; Vertical integration; COMPETITION; PRICE; COMPATIBILITY; DELEGATION; ECONOMICS; FIRM;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econlet.2016.12.024

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Considering the interplay between network externalities and the degree of product substitutability in a vertical structure, we compare the outcomes of vertical integration and vertical separation. In contrast to previous results, we show that when both products are sufficiently close substitutes, there is a threshold level of the network externality parameter, beyond which vertical separation is more efficient than vertical integration. This is due to the internalization of the network externality by a multiproduct monopolist, which, in the balance between the extensive and intensive margin, leads to higher output prices. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：115 / 118

页数：4

共 24 条

[1] COMMON MARKETING AGENCY AS A DEVICE FOR FACILITATING COLLUSION [J].