Agri-environmental policies for biodiversity when the spatial pattern of the reserve matters

被引：31

作者：

Bamiere, Laure ^{[1
]}

David, Maia ^{[1
]}

Vermont, Bruno ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] INRA AgroParisTech, UMR Econ Publ, F-78850 Thiverval Grignon, France

[2] CNRS INRA, GREMAQ, Toulouse, France

来源：

ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS | 2013年 / 85卷

关键词：

Agri-environmental policies; Biodiversity; Spatial pattern; Mathematical programming; Auction schemes; Agglomeration bonus/malus; CONSERVATION CONTRACTS; COMPENSATION PAYMENTS; FARMLAND BIRDS; AUCTIONS; DESIGN; HABITAT; AGRICULTURE; INCENTIVES; MANAGEMENT; SCALE;

D O I：

10.1016/j.ecolecon.2012.11.004

中图分类号：

Q14 [生态学（生物生态学）];

学科分类号：

071012 ; 0713 ;

摘要：

The aim of this paper is to compare different environmental policies for cost-effective habitat conservation on agricultural lands, when the desired spatial pattern of reserves is a random mosaic. We use a spatially explicit mathematical programming model which studies the farmers' behavior as profit maximizers under technical and administrative constraints. Facing different policy measures, each farmer chooses the land-use on each field, which determines the landscape at the regional level. A spatial pattern index (Ripley L function) is then associated to the obtained landscape, indicating on the degree of dispersion of the reserve. We compare a subsidy per hectare of reserve with an auction scheme and an agglomeration malus. We find that the auction is superior to the uniform subsidy for cost-efficiency. The agglomeration malus does better than the auction for the spatial pattern but is more costly. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：97 / 104

页数：8

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