Goal independent central banks: Why politicians decide to delegate

被引：22
作者：
Crowe, Christopher [1 ]
机构：
[1] Int Monetary Fund, Res Dept, Washington, DC 20431 USA
来源：
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY | 2008年 / 24卷 / 04期
基金：
英国经济与社会研究理事会;
关键词：
Central bank independence; Inflation; Coalition formation; Treatment effects;
D O I：
10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2008.05.002
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
A motivation for central bank independence (CBI) is that policy delegation helps politicians manage diverse coalitions. This paper develops a model of coalition formation that predicts when delegation will occur. An analysis of policy preferences survey data and CBI indicators supports the predictions. The model also explains why the expected negative relationship between CBI and inflation is not empirically robust: endogenous selection biases the estimated effect towards zero. The data confirm this. (C) 2008 International Monetary Fund. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：748 / 762
页数：15
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