Out of your mind: Eliciting individual reasoning in one shot games

被引：48

作者：

Burchardi, Konrad B. ^{[1
]}

Penczynski, Stefan P. ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Stockholm Univ, Inst Int Econ Studies, S-10691 Stockholm, Sweden

[2] Univ Mannheim, Dept Econ, D-68163 Mannheim, Germany

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2014年 / 84卷

关键词：

Individual reasoning; One shot games; Level-k model; P-BEAUTY CONTESTS; NORMAL-FORM GAMES; GUESSING GAMES; MODEL; COGNITION; BEHAVIOR;

D O I：

10.1016/j.geb.2013.12.005

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We experimentally investigate the fundamental element of the level-k model of reasoning, the level-0 actions and beliefs. We use data from a novel experimental design that allows us to obtain incentivised written accounts of individuals' reasoning. In particular, these accounts allow to infer level-0 beliefs. Level-0 beliefs are not significantly different from 50, and almost 60% of higher level players start their reasoning from a level-0 belief of exactly 50. We also estimate that around one third of the participants play non-strategically. The non-strategic level-0 actions are not uniformly distributed. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：39 / 57

页数：19

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