Out of your mind: Eliciting individual reasoning in one shot games

被引:48
作者
Burchardi, Konrad B. [1 ]
Penczynski, Stefan P. [2 ]
机构
[1] Stockholm Univ, Inst Int Econ Studies, S-10691 Stockholm, Sweden
[2] Univ Mannheim, Dept Econ, D-68163 Mannheim, Germany
关键词
Individual reasoning; One shot games; Level-k model; P-BEAUTY CONTESTS; NORMAL-FORM GAMES; GUESSING GAMES; MODEL; COGNITION; BEHAVIOR;
D O I
10.1016/j.geb.2013.12.005
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We experimentally investigate the fundamental element of the level-k model of reasoning, the level-0 actions and beliefs. We use data from a novel experimental design that allows us to obtain incentivised written accounts of individuals' reasoning. In particular, these accounts allow to infer level-0 beliefs. Level-0 beliefs are not significantly different from 50, and almost 60% of higher level players start their reasoning from a level-0 belief of exactly 50. We also estimate that around one third of the participants play non-strategically. The non-strategic level-0 actions are not uniformly distributed. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:39 / 57
页数:19
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