Convergence of strategic behavior to price taking

被引：5
作者：
Koutsougeras, Leonidas C. [1 ,2 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Manchester, Sch Social Sci, Manchester M13 9PL, Lancs, England
[2] Univ Catholique Louvain, CORE, B-1348 Louvain, Belgium
来源：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2009年 / 65卷 / 01期
关键词：
Strategic behavior; Price taking; Convergence; NON-COOPERATIVE EQUILIBRIA; WALRASIAN EQUILIBRIA; COMPLETE MARKETS; TRADING ECONOMY; COMMODITY; MONEY; GAME;
D O I：
10.1016/j.geb.2007.10.012
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We address the following issue: what can be said about the degree of competition, in a set of markets with a large number of participants, when no information on the distribution of individual characteristics is available? Our main result is that the proportion of individuals whose strategic behavior differs substantially from price taking, converges to zero as the number of market participants becomes large, regardless of the distribution of characteristics. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：234 / 241
页数：8
相关论文
共 18 条
12