No third-party punishment in chimpanzees

被引:106
作者
Riedl, Katrin [1 ]
Jensen, Keith [1 ,2 ]
Call, Josep [1 ]
Tomasello, Michael [1 ]
机构
[1] Max Planck Inst Evolutionary Anthropol, Dept Dev & Comparat Psychol, D-04103 Leipzig, Germany
[2] Univ London, Sch Biol & Chem Sci, Biol & Expt Psychol Grp, London E1 4NS, England
关键词
social evolution; human evolution; negative reciprocity; norm enforcement; great apes; COOPERATION; EVOLUTION; PUNISHERS; INEQUITY; ALTRUISM; MACAQUES; BEHAVIOR; MONKEYS;
D O I
10.1073/pnas.1203179109
中图分类号
O [数理科学和化学]; P [天文学、地球科学]; Q [生物科学]; N [自然科学总论];
学科分类号
07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;
摘要
Punishment can help maintain cooperation by deterring free-riding and cheating. Of particular importance in large-scale human societies is third-party punishment in which individuals punish a transgressor or norm violator even when they themselves are not affected. Nonhuman primates and other animals aggress against conspecifics with some regularity, but it is unclear whether this is ever aimed at punishing others for noncooperation, and whether third-party punishment occurs at all. Here we report an experimental study in which one of humans' closest living relatives, chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), could punish an individual who stole food. Dominants retaliated when their own food was stolen, but they did not punish when the food of third-parties was stolen, even when the victim was related to them. Third-party punishment as a means of enforcing cooperation, as humans do, might therefore be a derived trait in the human lineage.
引用
收藏
页码:14824 / 14829
页数:6
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