Misrepresentation of utilities in bargaining:: Pure exchange and public good economies

被引：6

作者：

Kibris, Ö ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Sabanci Univ, Fac Arts & Social Sci, TR-81474 Istanbul, Turkey

[2] Univ Catholique Louvain, CORE, B-1348 Louvain, Belgium

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2002年 / 39卷 / 01期

关键词：

bargaining; Walrasian rule; Lindahl rule; distortion game; interiority;

D O I：

10.1006/game.2001.0884

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In order to analyze bargaining in pure exchange and public good economics when the agents are not informed about their opponents' payoffs. we embed each bargaining problem into a noncooperative game of misrepresentation. In pure exchange (public good) economies with an arbitrary number of agents whose true utilities satisfy a mild assumption, the set of allocations obtained at the linear-strategies Nash equilibria of this game is equal to the set of constrained Walrasian (Lindahl) allocations with respect to the agents' true utilities. Without this assumption, the result holds for two-agent pure-exchange economies and, under alternative assumptions, for public good economies. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).

引用

页码：91 / 110

页数：20