Non-Exclusive Financial Advice

被引：3

作者：

Piccolo, Salvatore ^{[1
]}

Puopolo, Giovanni W. ^{[2
,3
]}

Vasconcelos, Luis ^{[4
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Cattolica Sacro Cuore, I-20123 Milan, Italy

[2] Univ Naples Federico II, Bocconi Univ, CSEF, Naples, Italy

[3] BaffiCarefin Ctr, Milan, Italy

[4] Nova Sch Business & Econ, Lisbon, Portugal

来源：

REVIEW OF FINANCE | 2016年 / 20卷 / 06期

关键词：

PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT; RISK-TAKING; COMPETITION; HEURISTICS; DELEGATION; AUTHORITY;

D O I：

10.1093/rof/rfv055

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We propose a simple model of non-exclusive financial advice in which two households rely on a self-interested (common) expert to make their investment choices. There is only one source of risk, and the expert is privately informed about the risky asset's volatility. When monetary transfers are unenforceable, we show that investors may delegate their investment decisions to the expert. When doing so, however, they impose restrictions on her choices which crucially depend on whether the expert perceives investors' asset allocations as complements or as substitutes. Finally, we analyze the implications of non-exclusivity in financial advice on investment behavior and welfare, and highlight a set of novel testable implications.

引用

页码：2079 / 2123

页数：45

共 33 条

[1] Does it all add up? Benchmarks and the compensation of active portfolio managers [J].