Vagueness indeterminacy and social meaning

被引:0
作者
Williamson, T [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Oxford, Oxford OX1 2JD, England
来源
LANGUAGE-MEANING-SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDIES | 2001年 / 16卷
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中图分类号
H0 [语言学];
学科分类号
030303 ; 0501 ; 050102 ;
摘要
Vagueness is distinguished from unspecificity, ambiguity and context-dependence. The classical sorites paradox is explained as a way in which vagueness challenges the application of formal logic to natural languages. Accounts of the paradox based on fuzzy logic are shown to be flawed. The widespread idea that borderline cases of vague expressions involve non-epistemic indeterminacy is rejected on the grounds that it mystifies the notions of truth and falsity. An epistemic account is proposed on which borderline cases involve radical ignorance of a special kind. The account is compatible with the idea that the meaning of an expression supervenes on its use. The account is also argued to be compatible with the possibility of communication, given the social determination of linguistic meaning and even of propositional content in specific contexts.
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页码:61 / 76
页数:16
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