Reining in excessive risk-taking by executives: the effect of accountability

被引：17

作者：

Lefebvre, Mathieu ^{[1
]}

Vieider, Ferdinand M. ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Liege, CREPP, B-4000 Liege, Belgium

[2] WZB, D-10785 Berlin, Germany

来源：

THEORY AND DECISION | 2013年 / 75卷 / 04期

关键词：

Executive compensation; Stock options; Incentives; Accountability; Risk-taking; LOSS AVERSION; PROSPECT-THEORY; COMPENSATION; BEHAVIOR;

D O I：

10.1007/s11238-012-9335-2

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Performance-contingent compensation by means of stock options may induce risk-taking in agents that is excessive from the point of view of the company or the shareholders. We test whether increasing shareholder control may be an effective checking mechanism to rein in such excessive risk-taking. We thus tell one group of experimental CEOs that they may have to justify their decision-making processes in front of their shareholders. This indeed reduces risk-taking and increases the performance of the companies they manage. Implications are discussed.

引用

页码：497 / 517

页数：21

共 35 条

[1] A tractable method to measure utility and loss aversion under prospect theory [J].