Location choice, competition, and welfare in non-tradable service FDI

被引：7

作者：

Kurata, Hiroshi ^{[1
]}

Ohkawa, Takao ^{[2
]}

Okamura, Makoto ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Ritsumeikan Univ, Res Org Social Sci, Kyoto, Japan

[2] Ritsumeikan Univ, Fac Econ, Kyoto, Japan

[3] Hiroshima Univ, Dept Econ, Hiroshima 730, Japan

来源：

INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF ECONOMICS & FINANCE | 2009年 / 18卷 / 01期

基金：

日本学术振兴会;

关键词：

Non-tradable service FDI; Location choice; Quasi-Cournot behavior; FREE ENTRY;

D O I：

10.1016/j.iref.2008.02.003

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We investigate whether non-tradable service FDI is efficient from a welfare point of view. A fixed number of firms strategically decide which markets to locate in and then compete in quasi-Cournot fashion. Considering firm location in two symmetric markets. non-tradable service FDI may or may not be efficient for the source country. depending on the total number of firms, competition in markets and the curvature of the demand function. In contrast, non-tradable service FDI is always efficient for the host country and the overall economy. This implies that any policy that affects firm location between two symmetric markets will not be beneficial from a welfare viewpoint. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：20 / 25

页数：6

共 7 条

[1] TACIT COLLUSION, FREE ENTRY AND WELFARE [J].