Information provision and behaviour-based price discrimination

被引：20

作者：

De Nijs, Romain ^{[1
,2
]}

机构：

[1] Ecole Ponts ParisTech, Paris Sch Econ, 48 Blvd Jourdan, F-75014 Paris, France

[2] Crest Lab Econ Ind, F-75014 Paris, France

来源：

INFORMATION ECONOMICS AND POLICY | 2013年 / 25卷 / 01期

关键词：

Price discrimination; Informative advertising; Mixed pricing;

D O I：

10.1016/j.infoecopol.2013.01.003

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This article examines a model wherein firms first advertise their existence to consumers and, in the two following periods, compete with uniform pricing and then with behaviour-based price discrimination. I show that allowing firms to price discriminate can restore symmetry in equilibrium advertising decisions. I also establish that price discrimination increases (resp. decreases) profits and total welfare but hurts (resp, benefits) consumers when the advertising cost is high (resp. low). (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：32 / 40

页数：9

共 18 条

[1]

Baker WalterL., 2001, The McKinsey Quarterly, V10, P1

[2] EQUILIBRIUM DISTRIBUTIONS OF SALES AND ADVERTISING PRICES [J].