Early selection and moral hazard

被引：1

作者：

Lee, Kangoh ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] San Diego State Univ, Dept Econ, San Diego, CA 92182 USA

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2012年 / 116卷 / 02期

关键词：

Early selection; Effort; Moral hazard; PERFORMANCE; MARKET;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econlet.2012.02.029

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

The selection of individuals into a school or job or team may be made early based on the expected skills. For instance, children are selected into an academic or a vocational education track at early ages in Germany and other European countries. The paper considers the effects of such early selection on the incentive to make effort. (c) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：139 / 142

页数：4

共 12 条

[1] Does educational tracking affect performance and inequality?: Differences-in-differences evidence across countries [J].