Populism, Political Pressure and Central Bank (in)Dependence

被引：9

作者：

Masciandaro, Donato ^{[1
,2
,3
]}

Passarelli, Francesco ^{[2
,4
]}

机构：

[1] Bocconi Univ, Dept Econ, Milan, Italy

[2] Bocconi Univ, BAFFI Carefin Ctr, Milan, Italy

[3] SUERF, Milan, Italy

[4] Univ Turin, Dept Econ, Turin, Italy

来源：

OPEN ECONOMIES REVIEW | 2020年 / 31卷 / 03期

关键词：

Populism; Monetary policy; Central bank Independence; Inequality; Political economics; MONETARY-POLICY; HETEROGENEITY;

D O I：

10.1007/s11079-019-09550-w

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This article analyses the relationships between inequality, political pressure, populism and central bank independence (CBI). If there is financial inequality across citizens, monetary policies yield distributional consequences. Political pressure on central bank will increase. A populist wave fuelled by large demand for redistribution with no regard to long term consequences may undermine actual CBI.

引用

页码：691 / 705

页数：15

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