Potential games

被引：2919
作者：
Monderer, D
Shapley, LS
机构：
[1] UNIV CALIF LOS ANGELES,DEPT ECON,LOS ANGELES,CA 90024
[2] UNIV CALIF LOS ANGELES,DEPT MATH,LOS ANGELES,CA 90024
来源：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 1996年 / 14卷 / 01期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1006/game.1996.0044
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We define and discuss several notions of potential functions for games in strategic form. We characterize games that have a potential function, and we present a variety of applications. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
引用
收藏
页码：124 / 143
页数：20
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