Impact of Venture Capital Investment on Firm Performance: An Indian Evidence

被引：8

作者：

Katti, Supriya ^{[1
]}

Raithatha, Mehul ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Indian Inst Technol Kanpur, Dept Ind & Management Engn, Kanpur, Uttar Pradesh, India

[2] Indian Inst Management Indore, Finance & Accounting Area, Rau Pithampur Rd, Indore, Madhya Pradesh, India

来源：

GLOBAL BUSINESS REVIEW | 2020年 / 21卷 / 04期

关键词：

Venture capital; firm performance; private equity; India; PRIVATE EQUITY; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; LARGE SHAREHOLDERS; PANEL-DATA; OWNERSHIP; PLACEMENTS; ACTIVISM; MARKETS;

D O I：

10.1177/0972150918779165

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We evaluate the monitoring and certification hypotheses associated with venture capital (VC) investors involved with Indian listed firms having the potential to influence firm performance. Empirical results of our study do not support monitoring and certification hypotheses associated for VC investors involved in publicly listed firms in India. On the other hand, we find the evidence of value erosion due to the presence of VC investors. The negative effect is justified through the opportunistic behaviour of the investor having a very easy route to exit investment through the secondary market in case of expected underperformance of the firm. The study also reveals that the origin of VC investors does influence firm performance. The results have a significant impact due to the regulatory framework defining the portfolio of VC investors.

引用

页码：1011 / 1024

页数：14

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