Deregulating the pharmacy market: the case of Iceland and Norway

被引:37
作者
Anell, A [1 ]
机构
[1] Swedish Inst Hlth Econ, S-22002 Lund, Sweden
关键词
pharmacy market; deregulation; competition; horizontal integration; vertical integration; Iceland; Norway;
D O I
10.1016/j.healthpol.2005.01.020
中图分类号
R19 [保健组织与事业(卫生事业管理)];
学科分类号
摘要
The pharmacy market in many European countries is characterised by individually owned pharmacies that operate under tight government control regarding barriers to entry, scope of activities and profit margins. Many countries are, however, in the process of introducing pro-competitive policies, including possibilities to own several pharmacies and competition based on price. In Iceland and Norway, restrictions to ownership and competition were relaxed in 1996 and 200 1, respectively. In both countries, the new policies quickly led to horizontal integration and concentration of the market, and in Norway the merging pharmacy groups integrated vertically with wholesalers. By 2004, two pharmacy groups in Iceland and three pharmacy groups in Norway controlled 85 and 97% of the markets, respectively. In combination with remaining barriers to entry, this market concentration may call for additional pro-competitive interventions to prevent unfavourable developments. Such policies will simultaneously make it more difficult to uphold traditional social objectives related to pharmacy services. Experiences in both Iceland and Norway highlight the complexity of managing reforms that fundamentally influence competitive behaviour. (c) 2005 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All tights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:9 / 17
页数:9
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