The Origins of Voluntary Compliance: Attitudes toward Taxation in Urban Nigeria

被引:74
作者
Bodea, Cristina [1 ]
Lebas, Adrienne
机构
[1] Michigan State Univ, Dept Polit Sci, E Lansing, MI 48824 USA
关键词
PUBLIC-GOODS; TRUST; TAXES; GOVERNMENT; POLITICS; ECONOMY;
D O I
10.1017/S000712341400026X
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
Voluntary compliance is an important aspect of strong tax regimes, but there is limited understanding of how social norms favoring compliance emerge. Using novel data from urban Nigeria, where tax enforcement is weak, this article shows that individuals with a positive experience of state services delivery are more likely to express belief in an unconditioned citizen obligation to pay tax. In addition to support for this fiscal exchange mechanism, social context is consequential. Where individuals have access to community-provided goods, which may substitute for effective state services provision, they are less likely to adopt pro-compliance norms. Finally, the article shows that norm adoption increases tax payment. These findings have broad implications for literatures on state formation, taxation and public goods provision.
引用
收藏
页码:215 / 238
页数:24
相关论文
共 55 条
[1]   Public goods and ethnic divisions [J].
Alesina, A ;
Baqir, R ;
Easterly, W .
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1999, 114 (04) :1243-1284
[2]   WHY DO PEOPLE PAY TAXES [J].
ALM, J ;
MCCLELLAND, GH ;
SCHULZE, WD .
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 1992, 48 (01) :21-38
[3]  
ALM J, 1992, AM ECON REV, V82, P1018
[4]   Russian attitudes toward paying taxes-before, during, and after the transition [J].
Alm, James ;
Martinez-Vazque, Jorge ;
Torgler, Benno .
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SOCIAL ECONOMICS, 2006, 33 (12) :832-+
[5]   Corruption, political allegiances, and attitudes toward government in contemporary democracies [J].
Anderson, CJ ;
Tverdova, YV .
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, 2003, 47 (01) :91-109
[6]  
Andreoni J, 1998, J ECON LIT, V36, P818
[7]  
[Anonymous], 2011, 126 AFR
[8]  
[Anonymous], NAT CRIM VICT SAF SU
[9]  
[Anonymous], ANN REPORT
[10]  
[Anonymous], 116 AFR