MORAL HAZARD IN HEALTH INSURANCE: DO DYNAMIC INCENTIVES MATTER?

被引：72

作者：

Aron-Dine, Aviva ^{[1
]}

Einav, Liran ^{[2
,3
]}

Finkelstein, Amy ^{[3
,4
]}

Cullen, Mark ^{[2
,3
]}

机构：

[1] US Off Management & Budget, London, England

[2] Stanford Univ, Stanford, CA 94305 USA

[3] NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA

[4] MIT, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA

来源：

REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS | 2015年 / 97卷 / 04期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

MEDICAL-CARE; DEMAND; DEDUCTIBLES; SELECTION;

D O I：

10.1162/REST_a_00518

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Using data from employer-provided health insurance and Medicare Part D, we investigate whether health care utilization responds to the dynamic incentives created by the nonlinear nature of health insurance contracts. We exploit the fact that because annual coverage usually resets every January, individuals who join a plan later in the year face the same initial ("spot") price of health care but a higher expected end-of-year ("future") price. We find a statistically significant response of initial utilization to the future price, rejecting the null that individuals respond only to the spot price. We discuss implications for analysis of moral hazard in health insurance.

引用

页码：725 / 741

页数：17

共 32 条

[1]

[Anonymous], 2004, SCHMEDULING UNPUB

[2]

Aron-Dine A., 2012, Working Paper 17802

[3] The RAND Health Insurance Experiment, Three Decades Later [J].