Information disadvantage in linear Cournot duopolies with differentiated products

被引：12

作者：

Chokler, Adi ^{[1
]}

Hon-Snir, Shlomit ^{[1
]}

Kim, Moshe ^{[1
]}

Shitovitz, Benyamin ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Haifa, Dept Econ, IL-31905 Haifa, Israel

来源：

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION | 2006年 / 24卷 / 04期

基金：

以色列科学基金会;

关键词：

Cournot duopolies; cross-effects; information disadvantage;

D O I：

10.1016/j.ijindorg.2005.09.009

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We focus on a class of linear Cournot duopolies with differentiated products and prove that whether there is an information advantage or disadvantage depends on firms' information setup. Specifically, we show that when the cross-effects are common value, the uninformed firm that commits to quantity will not have lower ex ante profits than a firm that has complete information about its cross-effects. This result contrasts to the information advantage that holds in the same duopolies with independent cross-effects. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：785 / 793

页数：9

共 9 条

[1] Information advantage in Cournot oligopoly [J].