Practical reasoning and practical knowledge

被引:3
作者
Stout, Rowland [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Coll Dublin, Sch Philosophy, Philosophy, Dublin, Ireland
关键词
Practical reasoning; practical knowledge; intention in action; Anscombe; McDowell;
D O I
10.1080/00455091.2018.1463839
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
The judgement that provides the content of intention and coincides with the conclusion of practical reasoning is a normative judgement about what to do, and not, as Anscombe and McDowell argue, a factual judgement about what one is doing. Treating the conclusion of practical reasoning as expressing a recommendation rather than a verdict undermines McDowell's argument; the special nature of practical reasoning does not preclude its conclusions being normative. Anscombe's and McDowell's claim that practical self-knowledge is productive of action may be accommodated by identifying the content of practical knowledge not with the conclusion but with a premise of practical reasoning - a kind of practical reasoning that occurs within rather than before action.
引用
收藏
页码:564 / 579
页数:16
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