Cooperative Networks: Altruism, Group Solidarity, Reciprocity, and Sanctioning in Ugandan Producer Organizations
被引:79
作者:
Baldassarri, Delia
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Bocconi Univ, Dondena Ctr, New York, NY USA
Bocconi Univ, Princeton Inst Int & Reg Studies, New York, NY USA
NYU, Dept Sociol, New York, NY 10012 USABocconi Univ, Dondena Ctr, New York, NY USA
Baldassarri, Delia
[1
,2
,3
]
机构:
[1] Bocconi Univ, Dondena Ctr, New York, NY USA
[2] Bocconi Univ, Princeton Inst Int & Reg Studies, New York, NY USA
RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY;
COLLECTIVE-ACTION;
PUBLIC-GOODS;
FIELD EXPERIMENT;
SOCIAL COHESION;
UNITED-STATES;
EVOLUTION;
TRUST;
PUNISHMENT;
FAIRNESS;
D O I:
10.1086/682418
中图分类号:
C91 [社会学];
学科分类号:
030301 ;
1204 ;
摘要:
Repeated interaction and social networks are commonly considered viable solutions to collective action problems. This article identifies and systematically measures four general mechanismsthat is, generalized altruism, group solidarity, reciprocity, and the threat of sanctioningand tests which of them brings about cooperation in the context of Ugandan producer organizations. Using an innovative methodological framework that combines lab-in-the-field experiments with survey interviews and complete social networks data, the article goes beyond the assessment of a relationship between social networks and collective outcomes to study the mechanisms that favor cooperative behavior. The article first establishes a positive relationship between position in the network structure and propensity to cooperate in the producer organization and then uses farmers' behavior in dictator and public goods games to test different mechanisms that may account for such a relationship. Results show that cooperation is induced by patterns of reciprocity that emerge through repeated interaction rather than other-regarding preferences like altruism or group solidarity.