Does greater central bank independence really lead to lower inflation? Evidence from panel data

被引:20
作者
Posso, Alberto [1 ]
Tawadros, George B. [1 ]
机构
[1] RMIT Univ, Sch Econ Finance & Mkt, Melbourne, Vic 3000, Australia
关键词
Inflation; Central bank independence; Latent variable analysis; LATENT-VARIABLES; MONETARY-POLICY; DISCRETION; MODELS; RULES;
D O I
10.1016/j.econmod.2013.04.005
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
It has long been held that central bank independence (CBI) from political control is a necessary requirement to curb inflation. In recent times, however, this long held belief has been challenged. Using a recently compiled panel data set on central bank independence measures, the proposition that greater CBI leads to lower inflation is tested, using latent variable analysis. The use of this alternative econometric technique, along with two additional indicators that capture more appropriately the degree of de facto independence, leads to empirical results that are highly supportive of the negative relationship between CBI and inflation, thereby restoring faith in the conventionally held wisdom, that greater CBI is needed to lower inflation. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:244 / 247
页数:4
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