WHY DO GOVERNMENTS END UP WITH DEBT? SHORT-RUN EFFECTS MATTER

被引:8
作者
Desbonnet, Audrey [1 ]
Weitzenblum, Thomas [2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Paris 09, LEDa, F-75775 Paris 16, France
[2] Univ Lille 2, EQUIPPE, F-59000 Lille, France
[3] CEPREMAP, Fac Sci Jurid Polit & Sociales, F-59000 Lille, France
关键词
FISCAL-POLICY;
D O I
10.1111/j.1465-7295.2011.00410.x
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper reconsiders the impact of public debt in an economy with heterogeneous households and incomplete markets to emphasize the short-run effects of an increase in public debt. As compared to models that rest on steady-state analysis, we show that the welfare gains of a public debt increase are substantially higher when transitional dynamics are accounted for. The additional debt issue allows for a temporary reduction in the income tax rate, which stimulates labor supply and generates an overshooting of the interest rate. The short-run gains create a temptation to deviate toward higher levels of debt. Debt increases continue to generate welfare gains even when debt is considerably higher than its long-run optimal level. (JEL E60, H60)
引用
收藏
页码:905 / 919
页数:15
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