Bi-matrix Game Model and Nash Equilibrium Analysis Based on Non-expected Utility Theory

被引:1
作者
Xiong, Guoqiang [1 ]
Wang, Haitao [1 ]
Xing, Min [1 ]
机构
[1] Xian Univ Technol, Sch Econ & Management, Xian, Peoples R China
来源
2012 4TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INTELLIGENT HUMAN-MACHINE SYSTEMS AND CYBERNETICS (IHMSC), VOL 2 | 2012年
关键词
Game Theory; Non-expected utility; Emotional Function; RDEU-Bimatrix Game Model; MONOTONE RISK-AVERSION;
D O I
10.1109/IHMSC.2012.169
中图分类号
TP18 [人工智能理论];
学科分类号
081104 ; 0812 ; 0835 ; 1405 ;
摘要
Studies of the bi-matrix game are mostly based on the assumption that all players are rational people. But research results are conflict with the realities. In this paper, putting emotional factors in game structure, in non-expected utility theory, we established RDEU-Bimatrix Game Model which containing players' emotional preference. Using the Brouwer fixed-point theorem proved the existence of Nash equilibrium in RDEU-Bimatrix Game Model. Finally, through the numerical analysis we discussed the influence of players' emotional preference for Nash equilibrium.
引用
收藏
页码:306 / 309
页数:4
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