First-price auctions without affiliation

被引:5
作者
Monteiro, PK
Moreira, H
机构
[1] FGV-EPGE, 22250-900 RJ, Praia de Botafogo 190
[2] FGV-EPGE, 22250-900 RJ, Praia de Botafogo 190
关键词
first-price auction; affiliation;
D O I
10.1016/j.econlet.2005.08.006
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We give conditions for equilibrium existence in private value, symmetric, first-price auctions without affiliation assumptions. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:1 / 7
页数:7
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