Intrinsic and extrinsic motivations in primary care: An explanatory study among French general practitioners

被引:20
作者
Sicsic, Jonathan [1 ]
Le Vaillant, Marc [1 ]
Franc, Carine [1 ]
机构
[1] INSERM, CERMES3, UMR8211, U988, F-94801 Villejuif, France
关键词
General practitioners; Intrinsic motivation; Extrinsic motivation; Payment for performance; Multiple correspondence analysis; Multilevel analysis; FINANCIAL INCENTIVES; MULTILEVEL MODELS; HEALTH; PERFORMANCE; BEHAVIOR; QUALITY; REWARDS; DOCTORS;
D O I
10.1016/j.healthpol.2012.08.020
中图分类号
R19 [保健组织与事业(卫生事业管理)];
学科分类号
摘要
Background: Like many other OECD nations, France has implemented a pay-for-performance (P4P) model in primary care. However, the benefits have been debated, particularly regarding the possibly undesirable effects of extrinsic motivation (EM) on intrinsic motivation (IM). Objective: To examine the relationship between French GPs' IM and EM based on an intrinsic motivation composite score (IMCS) developed for this purpose. If a negative relationship is found, P4P schemes could have side effects on GPs' IM that is a key determinant of quality of care. Method: From data on 423 GPs practicing in a region of France, IM indicators are selected using a multiple correspondence analysis and aggregated from a multilevel model. Results: Several doctors' characteristics have significant impacts on IMCS variability, especially group practice and salaried practice. Qualitative EM variables are negatively correlated with the IMCS: GPs who report not being satisfied with their income or feeling "often" constrained by patients' requests in terms of consultations length and office appointments obtain a lower mean IMCS than other GPs. Conclusion: Our results provide a cautionary message to regulators who should take into account the potential side effects of increasing EM through policies such as P4P. (C) 2012 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:140 / 148
页数:9
相关论文
共 40 条
[1]  
[Anonymous], COCHRANE DATABASE SY
[2]  
[Anonymous], 1993, Theory and applications of correspondence analysis
[3]   The effect of explicit financial incentives on physician behavior [J].
Armour, BS ;
Pitts, MM ;
Maclean, R ;
Cangialose, C ;
Kishel, M ;
Imai, H ;
Etchason, J .
ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE, 2001, 161 (10) :1261-1266
[4]  
Badia JG, 2007, HLTH POLICY, V80, P2
[5]  
Bellamy V., 2010, ETUDES RESULTATS
[6]   Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation [J].
Bénabou, R ;
Tirole, J .
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 2003, 70 (03) :489-520
[7]  
BENWARE CA, 1984, AM EDUC RES J, V21, P755, DOI 10.2307/1162999
[8]  
Benzecri J.P., 1979, CAHIERS LANALYSE DON, V4, P377
[9]  
Bourgueil Y., 2007, ENJEUX EC COOPERATIO, P46