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The CEO as chief political officer: Managerial discretion and corporate political activity
被引:61
作者:
Hadani, Michael
[1
]
Dahan, Nicolas M.
[2
]
Doh, Jonathan P.
[3
]
机构:
[1] St Marys Coll Calif, Sch Business & Econ, Moraga, CA 94556 USA
[2] Temple Univ, Fox Sch Business, Philadelphia, PA 19122 USA
[3] Villanova Univ, Villanova Sch Business, Villanova, PA 19085 USA
关键词:
Corporate political activity;
CEO discretion;
Firm performance;
Agency theory;
Stewardship;
Corporate governance;
FIRM PERFORMANCE;
MODERATING ROLE;
AGENCY THEORY;
STRATEGY;
TENURE;
DIRECTORS;
BOARDS;
POWER;
GOVERNANCE;
SENIORITY;
D O I:
10.1016/j.jbusres.2015.03.046
中图分类号:
F [经济];
学科分类号:
02 ;
摘要:
Corporate political activity (CPA) is an important nonmarket strategy aimed at advancing a firm's interests by influencing public policy. Yet studies report mixed results as to the impact of CPA on firm outcomes. Building on recent extant research we suggest that one reason for the ambivalent evidence regarding the impact of CPA on firm performance is the moderating role of CEO discretion on the CPA-firm performance relationship. In a longitudinal study of S&P 1000 firms over 10 years, we test competing perspectives regarding the moderating impact of CEO discretion on the CPA-corporate performance relationship. We find that some aspects of CEO discretion, in particular CEO duality, moderate the relationship between CPA and performance. The findings provide some support for an agency view of the impact of CEO discretion the CPA-performance relationships, which carry implications for both scholarship and regulation in the areas of CPA and corporate governance. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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页码:2330 / 2337
页数:8
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