Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma

被引:93
作者
Hilbe, Christian [1 ]
Traulsen, Arne [2 ]
Sigmund, Karl [3 ,4 ]
机构
[1] Harvard Univ, Program Evolutionary Dynam, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[2] Max Planck Inst Evolutionary Biol, Dept Evolutionary Theory, D-24306 Plon, Germany
[3] Univ Vienna, Fac Math, A-1090 Vienna, Austria
[4] Int Inst Appl Syst Anal, A-2361 Laxenburg, Austria
基金
奥地利科学基金会;
关键词
Repeated games; Zero-determinant strategies; Cooperation; Reciprocity; Extortion; REPEATED GAMES; COOPERATION; EXTORTION; EVOLUTION; EQUILIBRIUM;
D O I
10.1016/j.geb.2015.05.005
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Within the class of memory-one strategies for the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, we characterize partner strategies, competitive strategies and zero-determinant strategies. If a player uses a partner strategy, both players can fairly share the social optimum; but a co-player preferring an unfair solution will be penalized by obtaining a reduced payoff. A player using a competitive strategy never obtains less than the co-player. A player using a zero-determinant strategy unilaterally enforces a linear relation between the two players' payoffs. These properties hold for every strategy used by the co-player, whether memory-one or not. (C) 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc.
引用
收藏
页码:41 / 52
页数:12
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