The effects of mafia infiltration on public procurement performance

被引：18

作者：

Ravenda, Diego ^{[1
]}

Giuranno, Michele G. ^{[2
]}

Valencia-Silva, Maika M. ^{[3
]}

Argiles-Bosch, Josep M. ^{[4
]}

Garcia-Blandon, Josep ^{[5
]}

机构：

[1] TBS Business Sch, Campus Barcelona,C Trafalgar,10, Barcelona 08010, Spain

[2] Univ Salento, Dipartimento Sci DellEcon A De Vitti De Marco, Piazza Tancredi N7, I-73100 Lecce, Italy

[3] EAE Business Sch, Campus Barcelona,C Tarragona 110, Barcelona 08015, Spain

[4] Univ Barcelona, Fac Econ & Empresa, Av Diagonal 690, Barcelona 08034, Spain

[5] Univ Ramon Llull, IQS Sch Management, Via Augusta 390, Barcelona 08017, Spain

来源：

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY | 2020年 / 64卷

关键词：

Corruption; Mafia infiltration; Public procurement; CORRUPTION; CONTRACTS; AUCTIONS; ENTRY; CRIME; COST; RED;

D O I：

10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2020.101923

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We examine the effects of Mafia infiltration on public procurement performance, based on a sample of 68,063 public work contracts (PWC) awarded by Italian municipalities over the period 2012-2017, of which 687 are identified as Mafia-infiltrated, either because of being awarded by municipal councils subsequently dissolved due to Mafia infiltration, or because of being won by Mafia-owned firms. Our results reveal that Mafia infiltration is positively associated with number of submitted bids, awarding rebates and execution cost overruns, whereas it is negatively associated with delivery delays for PWC. The effect of Mafia infiltration on execution cost overruns and the probability of their occurrence is weaker for larger PWC, and the elections of the new municipal councils, after the dissolution of the previous ones, do not significantly influence the performance of PWC. Our findings suggest the presence of collusive schemes among bidding firms within the Mafia network and provide new insights for the implementation of more sound policies to tackle practices associated with Mafia infiltration in public procurement.

引用

页数：23

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