Deep, dark ... or transparent? Knowing our desires

The idea that introspection is transparent-that we know our minds by looking out to the world, not inwards towards some mental item-seems quite appealing when we think about belief. It seems that we know our beliefs by attending to their content; I know that I believe there is a caf, nearby by thinking about the streets near me, and not by thinking directly about my mind. Such an account is thought to have several advantages-for example, it is thought to avoid the need to posit any extra mental faculties peculiar to introspection. In this paper I discuss recent attempts to extend this kind of outwards-looking account to our introspective knowledge of desire. According to these accounts, we know our desires by attending to what in the world we judge to be valuable. This, however, does not deal satisfactorily with cases where my value judgments and introspective knowledge of my desires come apart. I propose a better alternative for the proponent of transparency, but one that requires giving up on the supposed metaphysical advantages.