A Stackelberg Model for Opportunistic Sensing in Cognitive Radio Networks

We consider a non-cooperative Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) game where Secondary Users (SUs) access opportunistically the spectrum licensed for Primary Users (PUs). As SUs spend energy for sensing licensed channels, they may choose to be inactive during a given time slot in order to save energy. Then, there exists a tradeoff between large packet delay, partially due to collisions between SUs, and high-energy consumption spent for sensing the occupation of licensed channels. To overcome this problem, we take into account packet delay and energy consumption into our framework. Due to the partial spectrum sensing, we use a Partial Observable Stochastic Game (POSG) formalism, and we analyze the existence and some properties of the Nash equilibrium using a Linear Program (LP). We identify a paradox: when licensed channels are more occupied by PUs, this may improve the spectrum utilization by SUs. Based on this observation, we propose a Stackelberg formulation of our problem where the network manager may increase the occupation of licensed channels in order to improve the SUs' average throughput. We prove the existence of a Stackelberg equilibrium and we provide some simulations that validate our theoretical findings.