Managing financial market expectations: The role of central bank transparency and central bank communication

被引:55
作者
Neuenkirch, Matthias [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Marburg, Fac Business Adm & Econ, D-35032 Marburg, Germany
关键词
Central bank communication; Central bank transparency; Financial market expectations; Interest rate decision; Monetary policy; Money market; MONETARY-POLICY; HETEROSKEDASTICITY;
D O I
10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2011.07.003
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
In this paper, we study the influence of central bank transparency and informal central bank communication on the formation of money market expectations. The sample covers nine major central banks from January 1999 to July 2007. We find, first, that transparency reduces the bias in money market expectations and dampens their variation. Second, informal communications help manage financial market expectations by reducing the variation of expectations. Third, various subcategories of the Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) transparency index lead to a smaller bias in expectations (in particular, evaluation of policy outcome and explanation of interest rate decisions) and to a reduction in the variation of expectations (in particular, explicit prioritization of objectives and provision of information on unanticipated macroeconomic disturbances). (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:1 / 13
页数:13
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