The final nail in WEP's coffin

被引：56

作者：

Bittau, Andrea ^{[1
]}

Handley, Mark ^{[2
]}

Lackey, Joshua ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] UCL, London WC1E 6BT, England

[2] UCL, London WC1E 6BT, England

[3] Microsoft Corp, Redmond, WA 98052 USA

来源：

2006 IEEE SYMPOSIUM ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY, PROCEEDINGS | 2006年

关键词：

D O I：

10.1109/SP.2006.40

中图分类号：

TP301 [理论、方法];

学科分类号：

081202 ;

摘要：

The 802.11 encryption standard Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) is still widely used today despite the numerous discussions on its insecurity. In this paper, we present a novel vulnerability which allows an attacker to send arbitrary data on a WEP network after having eavesdropped a single data packet. Furthermore, we present techniques for real-time decryption of data packets, which may be used under common circumstances. Vendor produced mitigation techniques which cause frequent WEP re-keying prevent traditional attacks, whereas our attack remains effective even in such scenarios. We implemented a fully automatic version of this attack which demonstrates its practicality and feasibility in real networks. As even rapidly re-keyed networks can be quickly compromised, we believe WEP must now be abandoned rather than patched yet again.

引用

页码：386 / +

页数：2