Say on Pay Votes and CEO Compensation: Evidence from the UK

被引：171

作者：

Ferri, Fabrizio ^{[1
]}

Maber, David A. ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Columbia Univ, New York, NY 10027 USA

[2] Univ So Calif, Los Angeles, CA 90089 USA

来源：

REVIEW OF FINANCE | 2013年 / 17卷 / 02期

关键词：

G34; G38; J33; M12; RELATIVE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION; SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM; STOCK-OPTIONS; EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; ACCOUNTING EARNINGS; PROPOSALS; OPPORTUNITIES; INCENTIVES; FIRMS;

D O I：

10.1093/rof/rfs003

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We examine the effect of say on pay regulation in the UK. Consistent with the view that shareholders regard say on pay as a value-creating mechanism, the regulation's announcement triggered a positive stock price reaction at firms with weak penalties for poor performance. UK firms responded to negative say on pay voting outcomes by removing controversial CEO pay practices criticized as rewards for failure (e.g., generous severance contracts) and increasing the sensitivity of pay to poor realizations of performance.

引用

页码：527 / 563

页数：37

共 85 条

[11] Investment opportunities and the structure of executive compensation [J].