Creditor Rights, Enforcement, and Bank Loans

被引：420

作者：

Bae, Kee-Hong ^{[1
]}

Goyal, Vidhan K. ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] York Univ, Schulich Sch Business, N York, ON M3J 1P3, Canada

[2] Hong Kong Univ Sci & Technol, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China

来源：

JOURNAL OF FINANCE | 2009年 / 64卷 / 02期

关键词：

ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE; DEBT MATURITY; MARKETS; GROWTH; DETERMINANTS; INSTITUTIONS; INFORMATION; LAW;

D O I：

10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01450.x

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We examine whether differences in legal protection affect the size, maturity, and interest rate spread on loans to borrowers in 48 countries. Results show that banks respond to poor enforceability of contracts by reducing loan amounts, shortening loan maturities, and increasing loan spreads. These effects are both statistically significant and economically large. While stronger creditor rights reduce spreads, they do not seem to matter for loan size and maturity. Overall, we show that variation in enforceability of contracts matters a great deal more to how loans are structured and how they are priced.

引用

页码：823 / 860

页数：38

共 48 条

[31] Ownership structure, corporate governance, and firm value: Evidence from the East Asian financial crisis [J].