Central bank boards around the world: Why does membership size differ?

被引：17

作者：

Berger, Helge ^{[1
]}

Nitsch, Volker ^{[1
,2
]}

Lybek, Tonny ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Free Univ Berlin, D-1000 Berlin, Germany

[2] Swiss Fed Inst Technol, KOF Swiss Econ Inst, Zurich, Switzerland

[3] Int Monetary Fund, Washington, DC 20431 USA

来源：

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY | 2008年 / 24卷 / 04期

关键词：

Committee; Council; Governance; Decision making; Monetary policy;

D O I：

10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2008.04.003

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper analyzes empirically differences in the size of central bank boards (or monetary policy committees) across countries. We discuss the possible determinants of a board's size. The empirical relevance of these factors is examined using a new dataset that covers the de jute membership size of 84 central bank boards at the end of 2003. We find that larger and more heterogeneous countries, countries with stronger democratic institutions, countries with floating exchange rate regimes, and independent central banks with more staff tend to have larger boards. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：817 / 832

页数：16