Agency cost of CEO perquisites in bank loan contracts

被引：2

作者：

Chan, Chia-Ying ^{[1
]}

Hasan, Iftekhar ^{[2
,3
,4
]}

Lin, Chih-Yung ^{[5
]}

机构：

[1] Natl Taipei Univ, Dept Business Adm, New Taipei, Taiwan

[2] Fordham Univ, 45 Columbus Ave,5th Floor, New York, NY 10023 USA

[3] Bank Finland, Helsinki, Finland

[4] Univ Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia

[5] Natl Chiao Tung Univ, Dept Informat Management & Finance, Hsinchu, Taiwan

来源：

REVIEW OF QUANTITATIVE FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING | 2021年 / 56卷 / 04期

关键词：

CEO perquisites; Agency cost; Loan spread; Corporate governance; Compensation schemes; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS; ACCOUNTING QUALITY; CASH FLOW; DEBT; PERKS; BOARD; FIRM; DETERMINANTS;

D O I：

10.1007/s11156-020-00926-5

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

This study investigates the association between CEO perquisites and bank loan spreads. We collect detailed data on CEO perquisites from the proxy statements of S&P 500 firms between 1993 and 2015 to study this issue. The empirical evidence supports the agency cost view that the lending banks demand significantly higher returns (spread), more collateral, and stricter covenants from firms with higher CEO perquisites. We further confirm that the effect of these perquisites remains after we control for various corporate governance and agency cost factors. We conclude that banks consider CEO perquisites as a type of agency cost when they make lending decisions.

引用

页码：1221 / 1258

页数：38

共 87 条

[1] The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey [J].

Adams, Renee B. ;

Hermalin, Benjamin E. ;

Weisbach, Michael S. .

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC LITERATURE, 2010, 48 (01) :58-107

[2] Executive perks: Compensation and corporate performance in China [J].

Adithipyangkul, Pattarin ;

Alon, Ilan ;

Zhang, Tianyu .

ASIA PACIFIC JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT, 2011, 28 (02) :401-425

[3] Financial constraints, asset tangibility, and corporate investment [J].

Almeida, Heitor ;

Campello, Murillo .

REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES, 2007, 20 (05) :1429-1460

[4]

Andrews A, 2009, AAA 2009 FINANCIAL A

[5]

Andrews A, 2017, REV ACCOUNT FINANC, V16, P21, DOI 10.1108/RAF-10-2014-0116

[6]

[Anonymous], Q J BUSINESS EC

[7] Corporate social responsibility, credit rating, and private debt contracting: new evidence from syndicated loan market [J].

Bae S.C. ;

Chang K. ;

Yi H.-C. .

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 2018, 50 (1) :261-299

[8] Board composition and CEO power [J].

Baldenius, Tim ;

Melumad, Nahum ;

Meng, Xiaojing .

JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2014, 112 (01) :53-68

[9]

Beasley MS, 1996, ACCOUNT REV, V71, P443

[10] What Matters in Corporate Governance? [J].

Bebchuk, Lucian ;

Cohen, Alma ;

Ferrell, Allen .

REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES, 2009, 22 (02) :783-827

← 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 →