Perceptual experience and seeing that p

被引:0
作者
French, Craig [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Antwerp, Ctr Philosoph Psychol, B-2000 Antwerp, Belgium
关键词
Perception; Seeing; Perceptual Experience; Perceptual Vocabulary;
D O I
10.1007/s11229-013-0259-3
中图分类号
N09 [自然科学史]; B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ; 010108 ; 060207 ; 060305 ; 0712 ;
摘要
I open my eyes and see that the lemon before me is yellow. States like this-states of seeing that p-appear to be visual perceptual states, in some sense. They also appear to be propositional attitudes (and so states with propositional representational contents). It might seem, then, like a view of perceptual experience on which experiences have propositional representational contents-a Propositional View-has to be the correct sort of view for states of seeing that p. And thus we can't sustain fully general non-Propositional but Representational, or Relational Views of experience. But despite what we might initially be inclined to think when reflecting upon the apparent features of states of seeing that p, a non-propositional view of seeing that p is, I argue, perfectly intelligible.
引用
收藏
页码:1735 / 1751
页数:17
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