Lewis' Strawman (philosophy of mind)

被引：0

作者：

Margolis, E ^{[1
]}

Laurence, S

机构：

[1] Rice Univ, Houston, TX 77251 USA

[2] Univ Sheffield, Sheffield S10 2TN, S Yorkshire, England

来源：

PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY | 2002年 / 52卷 / 206期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1111/1467-9213.00252

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

In a survey of his views in the philosophy of mind, David Lewis criticizes much recent work in the field by attacking an imaginary opponent, 'Strawman'. His case against against Strawman focuses on four central theses which Lewis takes to be widely accepted among contemporary philosophers of mind. The theses concern (1) the language of thought hypothesis and its relation to folk-psychology, (2) narrow content, (3) de se content, and (4) rationality. We respond to Lewis, arguing (amongst other things) that he underestimated Strawman's theoretical resources in a variety of important ways.

引用

页码：55 / 65

页数：11