Research on Power Analysis Against Software-based and Hardware-based Cryptographic Circuits

被引：0

作者：

Sun, Wei ^{[1
]}

Liu, Jun-Rong ^{[1
]}

Gu, Da-Wu ^{[1
]}

Guo, Zheng ^{[1
]}

Xie, Jun ^{[1
]}

Ma, Bo ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Shanghai Jiao Tong Univ, Shanghai 200240, Peoples R China

[2] Shanghai Huahong Integrated Circuit Co Ltd, Shanghai 200240, Peoples R China

来源：

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER SCIENCE AND COMMUNICATION ENGINEERING (CSCE 2015) | 2015年

关键词：

Cryptographic circuits; Side channel attacks; Power analysis; SM3-HMAC;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

TP39 [计算机的应用];

学科分类号：

081203 ; 0835 ;

摘要：

Nowadays, cryptographic circuits have been widely used in many fields such as finance, transportation and government business. Such devices have software and hardware implementations, as they both have certain weakness and constraints. In this paper, we research on both software and hardware cryptographic circuits based on the side channel technology. By using different power leakage models, we can point out the weakness operations of a cryptographic circuit that leaks secret information. Furthermore, we research on the differences between software and hardware implementations of SM3-HMAC, and propose power analysis methods respectively.

引用

页码：10 / 18

页数：9

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