Service outsourcing under different supply chain power structures

被引:36
作者
Bian, Junsong [1 ]
Lai, Kin Keung [2 ,3 ]
Hua, Zhongsheng [4 ]
机构
[1] RMIT Univ, Sch Business IT & Logist, Coll Business, 124 La Trobe St, Melbourne, Vic 3000, Australia
[2] Shaanxi Normal Univ, Int Business Sch, Xian, Peoples R China
[3] Univ Hong Kong, Dept Ind & Mfg Engn, Pokfulam, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
[4] Zhejiang Univ, Sch Management, Hangzhou, Zhejiang, Peoples R China
关键词
Service outsourcing; Channel power structure; Channel strategy; Supply chain efficiency; Supply chain management; DOMINANT RETAILER; PRICE-COMPETITION; CHANNEL STRUCTURE; DEPENDENT DEMAND; SENSITIVE DEMAND; COMMON RETAILER; QUALITY; INFORMATION; MANUFACTURER; COORDINATION;
D O I
10.1007/s10479-016-2228-y
中图分类号
C93 [管理学]; O22 [运筹学];
学科分类号
070105 ; 12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
This paper studies the impact of service outsourcing under three supply chain power structures: manufacturer-Stackelberg, vertical-Nash and retailer-Stackelberg supply chains. We first investigate price and service decisions by comparing the integrated channel and the decentralized channel with service outsourcing. It is found that a lower retail price or a higher service level could occur in the decentralized channel with service outsourcing compared to those in the integrated channel, but they never occur simultaneously. Next, we examine the manufacturer's channel strategies, and demonstrate that service outsourcing can always help the manufacturer earn more profit from the decentralized channel than from the integrated channel in the manufacturer-Stackelberg and retailer-Stackelberg markets, as long as the retailer's service investment is sufficiently efficient. However, in the vertical-Nash supply chain, this occurs only when the manufacturer is inefficient and the retailer is efficient enough in service provision. Finally, comparisons of channel efficiency and numerical analysis are provided.
引用
收藏
页码:123 / 142
页数:20
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