Motivating Hume's natural virtues

被引:1
作者
Reed, Philip A. [1 ]
机构
[1] Canisius Coll, Dept Philosophy, Buffalo, NY 14208 USA
关键词
natural virtues; moral motivation; Hume; moral sentiments;
D O I
10.1080/00455091.2012.981024
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
Many commentators propose that Hume thinks that we are not or should not be motivated to perform naturally virtuous actions from moral sentiments. I take issue with this interpretation in this paper, arguing that Hume fully incorporates the moral sentiments into his understanding of how human beings act when it comes to the natural virtues and that he does not see the moral sentiments as a problematic kind of motivation that threatens or weakens the virtuous status of the action.
引用
收藏
页码:134 / 147
页数:14
相关论文
共 27 条
[1]  
Ainslie Donald, 2007, POZNAN STUDIES PHILO, P79
[2]  
[Anonymous], 1994, HUME STUDIES
[3]  
[Anonymous], HUME STUDIES
[4]  
[Anonymous], STARTING WITH HUME
[5]  
[Anonymous], VALUES VIRTUES ARIST
[6]  
Baier Annette., 1991, A Progress of Sentiments
[7]   Hume's knave and the interests of justice [J].
Baldwin, J .
JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY, 2004, 42 (03) :277-296
[8]  
Baron Marcia., 1988, HUME STUD, V14, P25
[9]  
Besser-Jones Lorraine., 2006, HUME STUD, V32, P253
[10]  
BROWN C, 1988, J HIST PHILOS, V26, P69